The Rise of Ethical License by Guerrini, Christi et al.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Other Publications
2017




New York Law School, jacob.sherkow@nyls.edu
Christopher Scott
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons,
Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Other Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY VOLUME 35 NUMBER 1 JANUARY 2017
22 VOLUME 35   NUMBER 1   JANUARY 2017   NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
Christi J. Guerrini, Margaret A. Curnutte 
and Christopher T. Scott are at the Center 
for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor 
College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, USA, and 
Jacob S. Sherkow is at the Innovation Center 
for Law and Technology, New York Law School, 
New York, New York, USA. 
e-mail: guerrini@bcm.edu
The potential applications of CRISPR to 
alter future generations in unpredictable and 
unacceptable ways led a group of scientists 
and ethicists—including some inventors of 
the technology—to strongly discourage clinical 
applications of human germline editing until 
the risks and benefits have been thoroughly 
examined7,8. Nonetheless, Chinese research-
ers have moved ahead with experiments hav-
ing clear therapeutic goals. Using CRISPR in 
nonviable human embryos, one research team 
knocked out the human gene HBB, while 
another introduced CCR5, an HIV-resistance 
allele9,10.
As the United States, China, and the United 
Kingdom coordinate policy responses to these 
issues11, an international consensus on the 
use of CRISPR technologies is slowly emerg-
ing: controlled and transparent basic research 
should continue, but clinical applications 
The rise of the ethical license
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The Broad Institute’s recent licensing of its gene editing patent portfolio demonstrates how licenses can be used to 
restrict controversial applications of emerging technologies while society deliberates their implications.
In September 2016, the Broad Institute announced that it had licensed its patents 
for the groundbreaking CRISPR technology 
on terms intended to benefit a party not at the 
negotiating table: the public. As broader policy 
positions on gene editing technologies emerge, 
this agreement illustrates how licensing can 
serve as a tool to limit potentially controver-
sial uses of patented technologies as they enter 
the marketplace. Here, we discuss some of the 
advantages and barriers to using this approach.
CRISPR (bacterial clustered, regularly inter-
spaced, short palindromic repeats) is a gene 
editing tool that can disable, replace, or insert 
specific nucleotides in a genome, and the Broad 
owns what are considered to be the founda-
tional patents on this technology1. Although 
the University of California has launched 
a vigorous challenge to the Broad’s patent 
rights2, since 2014 the Broad has been offer-
ing licenses to its CRISPR patent portfolio for 
research and commercial purposes. A number 
of licensees are moving forward with applica-
tions of the technology while other researchers 
are developing their own intellectual property 
in unclaimed uses of CRISPR1. In 2015, over 
100 patent applications on CRISPR technology 
were pending3. Meanwhile, companies using 
first-generation gene editing technologies like 
zinc finger nucleases and TALENs (transcrip-
tion activator–like effector nucleases) are on 
the verge of bringing new products to market4.
As intellectual property rights in this tech-
nological space have multiplied, so, too, have 
ethical and social concerns about CRISPR’s 
potential applications. Those applications 
include altering human somatic cells, which 
make up organs, blood, and skin, and human 
germ cells, which include sperm and egg cells. 
While few would object to editing genes to cure 
devastating diseases, CRISPR technology has 
the potential to alter the health, behavior, and 
appearance of every life form. Some fear that in 
unscrupulous hands, CRISPR might one day be 
used to create humans genetically enhanced for 
intelligence, beauty, and strength. These fears 
are multiplied in cases of germline editing, 
where changes are passed on to future genera-
tions5. Worries about germline applications are 
heightened by CRISPR’s ability to power so-
called ‘gene drives’ that alter normal patterns 
of inheritance such that engineered genes are 
always passed on to future generations6. This 
technology can be used, for example, to engi-
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with such licenses. These spillover effects 
may include, for example, increased faith in 
scientific self-regulation and participation 
in research. Voluntarily restricting applica-
tions can also generate goodwill among the 
licensing parties and promote institutional 
leadership that might translate to new, col-
laborative partnerships. Presumably, at least 
some of these public and private benefits have 
prompted others to place patent-facilitated 
limits on controversial innovations. These 
include Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
scientist Kevin Esvelt’s plan to enforce gene 
drive patents against academics who use the 
technology but do not disclose their research 
plans and attendant safety and ethical issues14. 
Similarly, these benefits likely dovetail with 
humanitarian instincts to license technologies 
in less-than-profit-maximizing ways, such as 
requiring the development and distribution 
of technologies to underserved populations15.
For other technologies, however, there may 
be substantial uncertainty regarding which 
patent licensing restrictions will maximize 
social welfare—or at least prevent social 
harm. Technologies like CRISPR that impli-
cate large numbers of disparate social inter-
ests may sound an alarm that drowns clear 
calls to action. As a result, some licensors may 
forego pursuing socially beneficial licensing. 
Alternatively, they may adopt license terms 
that are inconsistent or even mutually defeat-
ing. Taking the concern to its extreme, patent 
owners may even reject coordination and elect 
instead to separately pursue lucrative applica-
tions that are widely opposed as unethical, such 
as licensing CRISPR technologies for germline 
engineering.
These problems are not intractable, however. 
CRISPR stakeholders agree on the need for a 
coordinated response to the scientific, ethical, 
legal, social, and governance issues associated 
with human gene editing, and several major 
efforts are underway to develop relevant prac-
tices and policies. We believe that these efforts 
should include explicit consideration of patent 
licensing as a tool of privately driven gover-
nance, which thus far has been absent from the 
conversation. Further, as to any restrictions on 
CRISPR specifically, we urge the consideration 
of whether such restrictions should be incor-
porated in patent licenses.
In the meantime, and looking beyond 
CRISPR to other controversial biotechnolo-
gies such as non-invasive prenatal testing, we 
urge innovators to follow the Broad’s lead and 
adopt the practice of using patent licenses to 
restrict socially harmful applications of their 
technologies. Innovators should be encouraged 
to identify and address such instances in their 
patent licenses.
should be banned until relevant safety, effi-
cacy, and ethical issues have been resolved. 
Meanwhile, a National Academy of Sciences 
committee is gathering information for the 
purpose of guiding US policy (http://nation-
alacademies.org/gene-editing/index.htm).
Given the enormous challenges of develop-
ing practice and legal standards that appro-
priately balance the interests of individuals, 
society, and future generations, it is no sur-
prise that researchers and policy makers are 
approaching these issues cautiously and with 
great care. The slow pace of social and ethical 
reckoning, however, means that until stake-
holders fully process CRISPR’s potential, it is 
free to be used—and abused—with few legal 
constraints.
Notably, the use of patent licensing to limit 
applications has not yet entered the national 
or international policy conversation. Yet, the 
Broad’s recent license of its CRISPR patent 
portfolio to Monsanto exemplifies a potentially 
powerful new solution to this temporal prob-
lem: using patent licenses to restrict socially 
controversial applications of a technology. 
During a patent’s term, one may not practice 
an invention claimed in the patent without a 
license from the patent holder. By prohibit-
ing uses the patent holder deems unethical, a 
patent license can function as a tool of private 
governance. And because the patent right is 
limited in duration, this approach has a built-
in expiration date far enough in the future to 
provide policy makers and broader society 
more time to move deliberatively toward policy 
solutions.
According to the license agreed upon by the 
Broad and Monsanto, Monsanto may use the 
Broad’s CRISPR patents for agricultural pur-
poses, such as the production of seeds that 
resist drought or present improved nutritional 
profiles. In conducting this research, however, 
Monsanto may not engage in three activities 
that the Broad identified as raising ethical and 
safety concerns.
The prohibited activities are: (i) performing 
gene drives that spread altered genes quickly 
through populations, which can alter ecosys-
tems; (ii) creating sterile ‘terminator’ seeds, 
which would impose a serious financial bur-
den on farmers who would be forced to buy 
them each year; and (iii) conducting research 
directed to the commercialization of tobacco 
products, which might increase the public 
health burden of smoking12.
Two years earlier, and with much less fan-
fare, the Broad exclusively licensed its CRISPR 
patents to Editas Medicine for human disease 
prevention and therapeutic purposes, and 
that license also includes socially beneficial 
restrictions. Specifically, Editas agreed not to 
use the technology to modify human germ 
cells or embryos for any purpose or to modify 
animal cells for the creation or commercializa-
tion of organs suitable for transplantation into 
humans13.
Using patent licenses to pause worrisome 
applications of emerging biotechnologies has 
several advantages over formal policy mak-
ing and standard setting. First, this private 
solution is more efficient than formal policy 
making because it does not require consensus 
among many stakeholders but only the com-
mitment of a single entity: the patent owner. 
And because the patent owner is frequently 
the original developer of the technology, it 
can be in the best position to anticipate con-
troversial applications. Second, unlike most 
professional guidelines, licensing restrictions 
are enforceable in court, and a licensor may 
include penalties in the license for violating 
those restrictions. Third, unlike laws and gov-
ernment regulations, which are typically blunt 
policy instruments, patent licenses can be tai-
lored to the specific circumstances of their par-
ties, who are motivated to ensure that any use 
restrictions are appropriately narrow. Fourth, 
licensing restrictions are the products of nego-
tiation among affected parties and therefore 
should be associated with greater buy-in than 
federal statutes and institutional standards dic-
tated, sometimes, by lay politics.
Despite these advantages, we recognize that 
there are substantial barriers to using patent 
licensing as a mechanism for curbing contro-
versial technological applications. For one, 
adding ethically motivated use restrictions to 
licenses decreases the value of those licenses, 
since those who agree to such restrictions 
generally receive a discount to bear the addi-
tional burden. An institution with significant 
financial interests at stake in its patents may 
be unwilling to weaken the market for those 
patents by playing ethicist.
More broadly, however, patent owners may 
be torn about policing socially beneficial limits 
on their technologies since doing so requires 
making—and assuming responsibility for—
difficult assessments of the implications for 
local, national, and global communities. For 
example, how should a licensor consider 
the ethics of technologies likely to affect the 
sequencing of native peoples who might 
oppose such research?
Although evaluations like these are impre-
cise, with respect to applications like germline 
editing, it is easier to conclude that concerns 
associated with those applications cur-
rently trump their potential benefits. In such 
instances, the social benefits associated with 
voluntarily engaging in ethical licensing will 
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For the sake of transparency and to facilitate 
further socially beneficial licensing, innovators 
should also be encouraged to follow the Broad’s 
example of publicly disclosing the terms of 
and reasoning behind any license restriction 
policies they have adopted16. Where licensing 
includes confidential business information, 
the public does not need to know the financial 
details of a licensing deal. But if socially benefi-
cial licensing is truly for the public, the patent 
holder should inform the public of any terms 
of use that are adopted on its behalf.
As a mechanism for addressing controversial 
applications of biotechnologies like CRISPR, we 
do not suggest that private agreements are pref-
erable to, or should be used to the exclusion of, 
policy making or professional standards setting. 
We view these two systems—public regulation 
and private governance—as complements to 
each other. We hope simply to highlight the 
advantages of private agreements that have 
not yet been fully exploited. Most likely, some 
combination of public and private efforts will 
be necessary to ensure that CRISPR’s promise 
of public welfare is fully realized.
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